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The United States Senate

R561

Report of Proceedings

INVENTORIED?

DN 3/1/77

BY 88

Hearing held before

Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities

Friday, July 18, 1975

Washington, D. C.

(Stenotype Tape and Waste turned over
to the Committee for destruction)

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C O N T E N T S

TESTIMONY OF

PAGE

John S. D. Eisenhower

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EXHIBITS

NUMBER

Eisenhower No. 1

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EXECUTIVE SESSION

Friday, July 18, 1975

- - -

United States Senate,
Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations with Respect to
Intelligence Activities,
Washington, D. C.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 12:05 p.m.,
in Room S. 407, the Capitol, Senator Frank Church (Chairman)
presiding.

Present: Senators Church (presiding), Huddleston,
Tower and Schweiker.

Also present: Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr., Chief
Counsel; Curtis R. Smothers, Minority Counsel; Charles Kirbow,
Elliot Maxwell, Michael Madigan, Frederick Baron, John Bayly,
and Elizabeth Culbreth, Professional Staff Members.

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1 The Chairman. The hearing will come back to order.

2 Mr. Eisenhower, would you please stand and take the
3 oath?

4 Do you swear that all the testimony you will give in
5 this proceeding will be the truth, the whole truth and nothing
6 but the truth, so help you God?

7 Mr. Eisenhower. I do.

8 TESTIMONY OF JOHN S. D. EISENHOWER

9 Mr. Schwarz. Mr. Eisenhower, I understand from your
10 conversations that you want to make a statement, and as I told
11 you, we always go through a procedural matter in the first
12 place, which is, first would you just state your full name and
13 address for the record.

14 Mr. Eisenhower. John S. D. Eisenhower, 111 White
15 House Road, Phoenixville, Pennsylvania.

16 Mr. Schwarz. And then the second thing is, as I told
17 you, we always ask all our witnesses if they know that they
18 have a right to counsel, and so forth.

19 Mr. Eisenhower. I am aware of that, sir.

20 Mr. Chairman, my opening statement or my whole statement
21 is first of all to say how delighted I am and how complimented
22 I am that you all allowed me to come here.

23 My motivation, of course, is that I understand that a
24 lot of the testimony that is before this Committee is getting
25 into matters of a somewhat conjectural nature, and perhaps

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1 I could throw a little bit of light and make a consideration
2 to it.

3 I am most appreciative to have the opportunity to come,
4 as I know you all are busy.

5 I realize that in a situation like this the only prob-
6 lem that I am addressing, of course, is the possible Presiden-
7 tial involvement in any planning, say, the latter part of 1960,
8 planning for the assassination of any individuals, not
9 only thinking in terms of heads of states or governments, but
1 any individual at all, Presidential involvement.

11 I realize that I would be somewhat of a suspect witness
12 in a case like this, being the son of the President at that time.
13 But I would just like to give a couple of facts that might have
14 a bearing.

15 The facts are that to a very large extent throughout
16 our adult years my father -- is that the correct terminology? --
17 confided in me to a very large degree. As an example,
18 in July of 1945, the evening he returned from the Potsdam
19 Conference to Frankfurt, he told me about a new bomb they
20 had invented that might shorten the war but which might have
21 some terrible consequences, namely, the atomic bomb, which
22 was dropped sometime after that.

23 Of course, you realize that this was secret. Whether or
24 was correct in telling me things like that or not I don't
25 know. But it is factual.

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1 YOU have seen Mr. Gordon Gray, you have seen General
2 Goodpaster. And when you have me as a third of the trilogy, you
3 will have all of the witnesses who were staff officers who had
4 access to the President in the latter half of 1960 on national
5 security affairs.

6 As such, I was told by my father of the U-2 in 1956. This
7 is four years before it went down. From the time of reporting
8 to the White House in 1958, as General Goodpaster's assistant
9 I was shown the flight plans of the U-2 up until the time that
10 the U-2 went down May 1 of 1960.

11 I say all this only to establish that the relationship
12 between my father and I in confidences was very close, par-
13 ticularly during that period. And that is my first point.

14 And the second is pure and simple, that nothing -- and,
15 of course, my exposure to the White House -- can be construed
16 in my mind in the remotest way to mean any Presidential knowl-
17 edge of or concurrence in any assassination plots or plans.

18 I wouldn't say for one moment that there weren't plenty of
19 plans being dreamed up in various agencies. I was a member of
20 the Joint War Plans in the Army Staff, Army General Staff
21 we made contingency plans for all sorts of things. Like the
22 umpire said, they ain't nothing until I call them. And to
23 the very best of my knowledge absolutely nothing came to the
24 White House.

25 And I said in a letter to Senator Schweiker when I was

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1 contemplating requesting this opportunity that I would trust
2 that I haven't gotten so blase over the years that something
3 like an assassination plan would have slipped my memory.

4 That is the end of my statement, sir.

5 The Chairman. Mr. Schwarz, do you have any questions?

6 Mr. Schwarz. Your opinion is that if your father had
7 been told about any CIA activity with respect to Mr. Castro,
8 and specifically with respect to Mr. Castro and the Mafia,
9 that he would have told you, and that your testimony is that
10 he did not tell you?

11 Mr. Eisenhower. My testimony is that he did not.
12 My conjecture, based on the other things he has told me, is
13 that in all likelihood he would have. But that is only
14 conjecture.

15 Mr. Schwarz. I think when we talked on the phone you
16 said something further in support of that conclusion, unless
17 I am mixing up something that General Goodpaster said, which
18 had to do with your father's attitude toward the control of
19 the Central Intelligence Agency after the U-2 incident.

20 Mr. Eisenhower. My guess is that you got that from
21 General Goodpaster. But General Paster and I -- after all,
22 I sat as far away from him as I am from you for two and a
23 half years, or 27 months, going in -- either he or I went
24 in to see the President when we were buzzed for on those
25 things. So, quite logically I think that General Goodpaster's

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1 and my thinking might be very much the same. And, of course,
2 after the U-2, when you have something like that, I think
3 it is only natural that you keep a little bit of a jaundiced
4 eye on the organization which has done this.

5 So we made a real point, never to let anyone, even
6 the Secretary of State, get in to see the President unless
7 one of us were there.

8 We were not according this privilege with Secretary
9 John Foster Dulles.

10 Mr. Schwarz. In the earlier years?

11 Mr. Eisenhower. But those are earlier years than the
12 years we are covering here.

13 When Secretary Herter took over in the spring of
14 1959, General Goodpaster and I tried an experiment. We
15 tiptoed in behind the Secretary of State when he went into the
16 Oval office and we got away with it. And from that time on
17 we monitored everything.

18 I saw the document we talked about on the telephone,
19 I saw the document that indicated 10 minutes where the Presi-
20 dent was alone with Allen Dulles on the 25th of November
21 1960. If I had not been made aware of that, or discovered
22 it myself going through those same black books that you have,
23 if I had not been aware of that, I would have testified to the
24 best of my knowledge and belief that the President never
25 saw Allen Dulles alone.

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1 Mr. Schwarz. We also talked on the telephone about --
2 I told you the nature of the testimony. We have heard from
3 an officer of the Central Intelligence Agency who said that
4 he had no knowledge of such a meeting, but that he assumed
5 that Allen Dulles would have spoken to your father about the
6 Mafia activity, and that the nature of that conversation
7 would have been speaking in riddles or circumlocutious form.

8 And I believe we discussed your opinion as to whether
9 your father would tolerate a discussion which was circumlo-
10 cutious. It is a confusing question, because your opinion
11 is that no such conversation occurred. But getting down to
12 testing the way in which the person who has testified described
13 it, and the elements he has put into it, can you cast any
14 light on that?

15 Mr. Eisenhower. Now, we are getting into an area of
16 conjecture in which my testimony would be suspect.
17 It is very much conjecture. And I would like to point out
18 that if I were in the position of anybody in this type of
19 operation, I would certainly have assumed, rightly or wrongly,
20 that I had some sort of authority from above before I went
21 ahead and did such a thing. I think it is only logical
22 that this gentleman who was testifying would assume that he
23 had some authority. That is a pretty big burden to take on
24 yourself. You say, look, it was my idea, and I just went ahead
25 and did it.

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1 That is one part of the conjecture.

2 The other part of the conjecture having to do with my
3 father's way of doing things, I think I could say with a
4 certain amount of assurance that he was never cute, cute
5 was one thing he was not. And being circumlocutious and
6 saying one thing and winking at you was not his way of doing
7 it. Something might get past him. But that is not the way
8 you make decisions to mount assassination plots, and
9 especially the details of it, no way.

10 Mr. Schwarz. Do you have an opinion from your knowledge
11 of your father as to how he would react to any suggestion
12 that the U.S. ought to employ the Mafia?

13 Mr. Eisenhower. Well, highly negative. I would say
14 this, that his visceral reaction to the Mafia -- he didn't
15 care for that kind of thing.

16 Now, if you have to do something -- I don't know whether
17 that would stand in the way or not. I have in mind -- look
18 at Darlan in November of 1941. There was nobody more
19 despised in the Western World than Darlan was. But Dad
20 had to deal with him for a short period of time in order to
21 get the French to stop fighting in North Africa.

22 I don't think I could really contribute much to that
23 question.

24 Mr. Schwarz. I just have one final question.

25 We have been wrestling with certain language in minutes.

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1 And this is one minute of -- were you shown this minute?

2 Mr. Eisenhower. Yes, sir.

3 Mr. Schwarz. -- of a minute of a meeting on September
4 2, 1960 of the National Security Council. And you were
5 present in your capacity as Assistant White House Staff
6 Secretary, I think.

7 Mr. Eisenhower. That is listed here, yes.

8 Mr. Schwarz. Now, on the 15-page of the memo there is
9 a discussion of Mr. Lumumba in the Congo, in fact it starts
10 on the 14th page. And at the end of the first paragraph of
11 page 15 there is this language:

12 "Mobutu appeared to be the effective power in the
13 Congo for the moment, but Lumumba was not yet disposed of and
14 remained a grave danger as long as he was not disposed of".

15 I suppose you don't have any recollection of that meeting?

16 Mr. Eisenhower. No, I don't have a direct recollection.
17 I remember in general terms that the U.S. position was very
18 much anti-Lumumba, there is no question about it.

19 Mr. Schwarz. Focussing on those words, do you take
20 the words "disposed of" as intended to mean an assassination?

21 Mr. Eisenhower. No, I don't. And I wouldn't be too
22 surprised -- in other words, I have no quarrel with this
23 document. This document fits in pretty much with any recollec-
24 tion of the atmosphere.

25 Now, I would not be surprised if the words "disposed of"

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1 didn't catch them all, they might have been doing something
2 else.

3 Mr. Smothers. That is what you mean by monitoring, she
4 listened to the phone calls and gave you a memorandum or
5 transcript?

6 Mr. Eisenhower. She didn't give the transcript to me,
7 she made it for herself. And Mr. Kelley can give you more
8 details on this than I can. He has been looking in Abilene.
9 She would put in the files a day's phone calls -- Cliff
10 Roberts called from Augusta National and he said this and
11 that. And then this might be an official thing on that, which
12 makes it difficult to clear the papers out of Abilene. I
13 would not say that her records are complete, but they were as
14 complete as she could take memoranda.

15 The Chairman. Did she do this pursuant to the Presi-
16 dent's instruction?

17 Mr. Eisenhower. Oh, yes. As a matter of fact, that
18 is not an unusual habit, I don't think, in government.

19 Mr. Smothers. I wasn't suggesting that there was
20 anything unusual about that or your going in to the President.
21 But was it your feeling that no one talked to the President
22 about national security until you were fully aware of the
23 contents of that discussion?

24 Mr. Eisenhower. There would certainly be leaks in the
25 system, no question about it. For example, after the President

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1 got back to the second floor of the White House in the even-
2 ings, his telephone calls would not be monitored. So some-
3 body could sneak in. If somebody was going to make a plan to
4 assassinate somebody over the telephone at six o'clock in
5 the evening, at the cocktail hour, my conjecture is that
6 that is not very realistic.

7 Senator Huddleston. Maybe that is where this plan was
8 hatched.

9 Mr. Smothers. I assumed that maybe you didn't go to the
10 golf course -- or maybe you did?

11 Mr. Eisenhower. I was there most of the time, but not
12 all. But Allen Dulles didn't go.

13 Mr. Smothers. Are we saying, then, that -- I am a little
14 bit disturbed by the notion that if anybody did it it was
15 Allen Dulles, and he must have come in at a time when the
16 office wasn't covered I think as I understand your testimony
17 the gist of it is that this is not the kind of thing that
18 your father would have had agreed with, and to the best of your
19 knowledge there was no opportunity at least for any extensive
20 consideration of this kind of option.

21 Mr. Eisenhower. There could have been none, extensive --

22 Mr. Smothers. To eliminate all would, of course,
23 require us to have some control of every possible contact, and
24 I don't think you are doing that, are you?

25 Mr. Eisenhower. We had it pretty well plugged up, but

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1 not perfectly, pretty well plugged up.

2 Mr. Smothers. I have nothing further, Mr. Chairman.

3 The Chairman. Senator Tower?

4 Senator Tower. No.

5 The Chairman. Senator Huddleston?

6 Senator Huddleston. Just a couple of questions, Mr.

7 Eisenhower.

8 To your knowledge, did President Eisenhower ever call
9 the Director of the CIA and give them specific instructions
10 on any subject or any operation?

11 Mr. Eisenhower. You say do I recall it? No.

12 Senator Huddleston. You do not recall it?

13 Mr. Eisenhower. No, I do not.

14 Senator Huddleston. Or any other person in the CIA?

15 Mr. Eisenhower. He would have dealt only with Allen
16 Dulles or General Cabell. But the nature of the CIA operations
17 is such, or was such, that it is not the kind of thing
18 that the President dreams up and says, well, we will get the
19 CIA to do this. Maybe that is in conflict to some of the
20 things that have happened since then. But I have no recollec-
21 tion of any time in which the President took an initiative of
22 asking the CIA to do anything.

23 Senator Huddleston. But you would say that it would be
24 inconsistent with perhaps, number one, President Eisenhower's
25 characterization the way he would operate, and inconsistent

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1 with the operational procedure that prevailed at the White
2 House for him to directly call the CIA direct or any of the
3 Director's subordinates issuing any kind of an --

4 Mr. Eisenhower. That would be inconsistent with his
5 habits, yes. And also an operation of this size, or this
6 significance, I can't imagine that being done without consult-
7 ing with the Secretary of State, or somebody.

8 One thing, his philosophy, which I know quite well, was
9 that no man is indispensable, and so killing somebody off is
10 not going to change the situation that much?

11 For example, when we were on this 11 nation trip in
12 December of 1959, the Presidential aircraft had to go through
13 a little 80-mile corridor between the Soviet Union and Iraq.
14 And Iraq was extremely unfriendly at that time. And there
15 were some people saying, isn't it a little dangerous for you,
16 President, to be tightrope walking through this 80-mile
17 corridor?

18 And he said, the silliest thing in the world they could
19 do is knock off the President of the U.S. He just laughed
20 at it. He didn't regard assassination as a feasible way of
21 doing business, because somebody else would step in, and
22 maybe the fellow who has been assassinated becomes a party.

23 .Senator Huddleston. Prior to the U-2 incident did the
24 President ever express to you or General Goodpaster any
25 concern about activities of the CIA whether or not some of

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1 the things they did had a high risk potential or might get
2 the country into trouble, or might get the Presidency into
3 trouble?

4 Mr. Eisenhower. No. To the best of my recollection, I
5 don't remember his saying anything like -- for one thing,
6 on the U-2, he may have said something like, this thing is not
7 going to go on forever -- he may have, I don't know.

8 He did have -- and I am sure that you have all the
9 reports of the Committee -- an intelligence monitoring committee,
10 or whatever you call it. I remember Mr. Leavitt was one of
11 the members of it. They were former public servants -- they
12 were sort of a advisory committee, and they met with the
13 Director of the CIA. And they had recommendations for the im-
14 provement of CIA procedures, namely, improvement in adminis-
15 tration, because an administration outfit like that really means
16 that A knows what B is doing, which did not seem to
17 be always the case.

18 And I remember ver well that the Committee was critical
19 of the CIA operations, and the recommendations were completely
20 rejected by CIA --

21 Senator Huddleston. Does that preface what the state
22 of mind or attitude was?

23 Mr. Eisenhower. His attitude was that the CI could be
24 doing better, but Mr. Dulles is so indispensable that we have
25 to do it that way. That has to do with the administration.

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1 But the administration is part of the operation.

2 Senator Huddleston. So he relied heavily on Mr.

3 Allen Dulles?

4 Mr. Eisenhower. Yes.

5 Senator Huddleston. And he had great confidence in him?

6 Mr. Eisenhower. Yes.

7 Senator Huddleston. Maybe until the U-2?

8 Mr. Eisenhower. Yes, I think the U-2 was injurious to

9 that confidence.

10 The Chairman. Any questions, Senator Schweiker?

11 Senator Schweiker. Just one, Mr. Chairman.

12 John, after your father left the White House --

13 we have talked about now mainly your time and his time at the

14 White House -- after your father left the White House, did he

15 ever give intimation or indication to you or to any of your

16 friends or associates about in retrospect any attempts

17 against either Castro or Lumumba, ever discuss it in any way

18 as far as assassination is concerned, now?

19 Mr. Eisenhower. Senator, I can't recall any of those

20 foreign assassinations, I can't recall his ever commenting

21 significantly on that.

22 Senator Schweiker. The other question is -- that was

23 the general question about discussing it in any way -- he

24 specifically never, after he left the White House, gave any

25 indication to you or any of your associates that there was

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1 any active participation by the White House or approval by
2 the White House of any kind of an operation?

3 Mr. Eisenhower. In his time, no, certainly. I was
4 just trying to figure if he had any opinions when Lumumba
5 finally was assassinated, or anything like that. But as far
6 as his own activity was concerned, absolutely not.

7 Now, there is one meeting where he and Lord Hume did
8 some joking, if I remember. I was there. But it was
9 all just a big laugh -- I hope somebody pushes this guy
10 off a bridge or something like that. And as I remember, Lord
11 Hume said, it so happens that we have lost the technique of
12 old-fashioned diplomacy. And I discount that. I was there.
13 That was during the meeting with the British Foreign Secretary.

14 To summarize, with all these caveats and so forth, my
15 testimony is still pretty simple, that I feel if anything
16 like that had been going on, I believe, based on the other
17 confidences that my father had given me, that I would have
18 known about it, and I could testify and he knew absolutely
19 nothing about anything.

20 The Chairman. Thank you very much.

21 (A memorandum was marked for
22 identification as Eisenhower
23 Exhibit No. 1.)
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1 The Chairman. The Committee will reconvene at two
2 o'clock for the completion of Mr. Goodwin's testimony.

3 (Whereupon, at 12:35 p.m., the Committee recessed, to
4 reconvene at 2:00 p.m., the same day.)

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Eisenhower Ex. No 1

7-18-75 TESTIMONY

September 21, 1960

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Discussion at the 460th Meeting
of the National Security Council,
Wednesday, September 21, 1960

Present at the 460th NSC Meeting were the President of the United States, presiding; the Acting Secretary of State (Dillon); the Secretary of Defense; and the Acting Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization (Patterson). Also present at the Meeting and participating in the Council Actions below were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Attorney General (Items 1 and 2); the Secretary of Commerce (Items 1, 2 and 3); the Acting Secretary of the Interior (Bennett) (Items 1 and 2); Mr. Tom Killefer for the President, Export-Import Bank of Washington (Items 1 and 2); and the Chairman, Council on Foreign Economic Policy (Item 3). Also attending the Meeting were the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Special Assistants to the President for National Security Affairs and for Security Operations Coordination; Assistant Secretary of Defense John N. Irwin, II; Mr. Robert Packard for the Department of State; Mr. Knight McMahan, Central Intelligence Agency; the White House Staff Secretary; the Assistant White House Staff Secretary; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the Meeting and the main points taken.

1. WESTERN EUROPEAN DEPENDENCE ON MIDDLE EAST PETROLEUM
(NSC Action No. 2080; Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated March 26, 1959, and June 28, 1960; NSC 6011; Memos for NSC, same subject, dated August 9 and 29, and September 19, 1960)

Mr. Gray introduced the subject to the Council. (A copy of Mr. Gray's Briefing Note is filed in the Minutes of the Meeting and another copy is attached to this Memorandum).

At the conclusion of Mr. Gray's presentation, the President said he had received the most glowing reports on the prospects for petroleum production in Libya. He had been told that the Libyan reserves exceeded even the Sahara reserves. He asked

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kept under continuing scrutiny by all interested departments and agencies to ensure that it serves the purposes of retarding the growth of the war potential of the Sino-Soviet Bloc and reducing its unity. Noted that, with respect to paragraph 11 of NSC 5704/3, U.S. export controls over such materials, equipment, technology and services as can be unilaterally controlled by the United States may be imposed not only to achieve a worthwhile adverse impact on the war potential of the European Soviet Bloc, but also to serve other U.S. policy objectives, especially with regard to technology and services.

NOTE: The action in b above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to all holders of NSC 5704/3.

5. SIGNIFICANT WORLD DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING U.S. SECURITY 6(1)(B)

Mr. Dulles said he would first summarize developments in the Congo. Several African states were making frantic efforts to save Lumumba. 16

Nasser is urging the UAR, Ghana, and Guinea to concentrate their forces in Leopoldville and bring pressure to bear for the maintenance of Lumumba as Prime Minister. Mr. Dulles remarked that the bulk of the UAR forces now in the Congo had been placed advisedly in north Equateur Province while the Guinea forces were in the northern part of Leopoldville Province. 16

Nasser had asked that a council be formed in Leopoldville consisting of the diplomatic representatives of the UAR, Ghana, and Guinea in that city. The UAR Ambassador to the Congo had been directed, in concert with the Ambassadors of Ghana, Guinea and Morocco to attempt to persuade Kasavubu to effect a reconciliation with Lumumba. On September 20 Kasavubu had announced that he had reached no agreement with Lumumba but the latter had later displayed a piece of paper purporting to be an agreement with Kasavubu.

Secretary Dillon reported that Lumumba had requested a visa for travel to New York as the representative of the Congo to the UN and had also requested a visa as an official of the Government of the Congo. We had denied both requests for visas. However, if Lumumba asked for a visa to visit the U.S. as a private citizen, we would have difficulty in turning him down. Mr. Dillon added that the Congo Government declares it will arrest Lumumba if he attempts to leave the country.

Mr. Dulles said he believed a warrant had been issued for the arrest of Lumumba. Aside from Lumumba, Mobutu appears to be the only man in the Congo able to act with firmness. A recent attempt to assassinate Mobutu had failed.

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development has been Mobutu's creation of a council of advisers, most of whom are graduate students. The old ministers have been turned out of office and their offices have been taken over for the council, which is intended to carry on for a temporary period. Mr. Dulles reported that the USSR had suffered a severe blow to its prestige in the Congo. However, he had been surprised at the ease with which the Soviets were forced out of the Congo. He believed that the Soviet diplomats, after departing from the Congo, went to Accra but he did not know whether they had moved on toward the USSR. Mr. Gray asked whether the Soviets were really quitting the Congo. Secretary Dillon said the Soviet press has not yet admitted that the Soviets have quit the Congo. Mr. Dulles said the Soviet diplomats indicated to the press before leaving that they would be back. Secretary Dillon believed it was clear that the Soviets had not given up in the Congo. Mr. Dulles reported that the Soviet diplomats left the Congo so hurriedly that the Soviet markings which they painted over the Congo markings on their planes were still wet when they left. Mr. Dulles said the Soviet ships off the African coast were apparently awaiting a clarification of the situation. Mobutu appeared to be the effective power in the Congo for the moment but Lumumba was not yet disposed of and remained a grave danger as long as he was not disposed of.

Mr. Dulles observed that the situation in Laos was still confusing and that little progress had been made toward the settlement of the crisis during the past week. The threatening situation in Sam Neua Province, however, had been quieted as a result of the dispatch of Laotian parachute troops to that area. The situation remains troublesome because Pathet Lao and Viet Minh forces could intervene at any time. The problem of the conflicting governments in Laos is no nearer a settlement. The King has requested that General Ouane and General Phoumi call upon him. A skirmish between Phoumi's forces and Vientiane forces has been reported at Pak Sane, but little bloodshed resulted. Apparently, Phoumi has adopted tactics of carrying on a war of nerves against Vientiane. There has been firing across the Mekong River into the city and Phoumi apparently intends to starve out the government. Meanwhile,

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